What is the standard for a trial judge to grant a motion for new trial based on the “manifest weight of the evidence?” The Sixth District recently reminded us that the trial judge does not have a license to operate as a “Super Juror.” Rather, the trial court’s role is to assess the totality of the evidence presented at trial and intervene only when that evidence is “manifestly weighted” to the movant’s side. But how is this standard to be applied? 

In Smith v. Lyles, 364 So. 3d 1123 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023), a car crash case in which Smith rear-ended Lyles after Lyles allegedly made a “spike stop,” the Sixth District reversed the trial court’s order granting a motion for new trial. The facts of the case were these:

On October 9, 2017, Lyles and Smith were both stopped at a red light waiting to make a right-hand turn. Lyles was first in line to make the turn, and Smith was immediately behind Lyles. When the light turned green, Lyles began driving his car forward. Smith followed. Lyles testified that after beginning to move forward, he looked to his left to check whether any vehicles were approaching in the lane into which he was turning. As Lyles looked left, he saw a red truck preparing to run a red light and change lanes into his path. Smith testified that he also looked left as he began to move forward, he did not see any oncoming vehicles, and he continued to move forward. Lyles made a sudden stop and, although Smith applied his brakes, Smith’s car crashed into Lyles’ car.

Neither party reported any injuries at the scene of the collision and neither vehicle underwent any repairs. Lyles testified that later that day, he began to feel achy. Lyles went to the hospital, where he underwent an x-ray that revealed no evidence of fractures but did show signs of preexisting conditions. Subsequently, Lyles claimed he suffered numerous injuries as a result of the collision, including injuries to his head, neck, left shoulder, back, and knee. Lyles visited a chiropractor who found ruptured discs in his spine, and a neurologist that recommended Lyles undergo neck surgery to fuse his spine together. Lyles decided against that surgery and instead saw another doctor, who treated pain in Lyles’ left shoulder with a cortisone shot. On that doctor’s advice, Lyles later underwent shoulder surgery.

Lyles filed a complaint against Smith alleging negligence in connection with the collision. Smith denied he was negligent and asserted that it was reasonable for him to briefly look left for oncoming traffic while starting to turn right, that there was no oncoming truck for Lyles to avoid, and that Lyles’ arbitrary and abrupt “spike” stop caused the collision. Further, Smith claimed that the minimal forces in the accident could not have caused Lyles’ alleged injuries, and that Lyles’ injuries were instead the result of his documented degenerative, preexisting conditions which he had experienced for more than ten years before the accident.

Before trial, Lyles filed a motion in limine to prohibit Smith’s biomechanical expert, Dr. William Scott, from providing medical opinions. Smith responded that Dr. Scott would testify about the forces in the crash and the risk of injury in the accident. The trial court ruled that “Dr. Scott won’t be testifying about whether [Lyles] was injured in this accident nor permanency and — but there’s a lot of testimony around there that does relate to the issue of causation, so we’ll take it question by question.”

At trial, during voir dire, Lyles’ counsel, of the law firm of Morgan & Morgan, extensively explored the issue of bias against Morgan & Morgan attorneys and specifically asked the jury panel if they harbored any bias against Morgan & Morgan. The trial judge struck every prospective juror that Lyles challenged.

After Lyles completed his testimony at trial, a juror asked the question of what date Lyles retained Morgan & Morgan. The trial court found this information inadmissible and did not provide an answer to the jury.

During Smith’s testimony at trial, Lyles’ attorney asked Smith if he “accepted responsibility for causing the impact and the crash.” Smith responded:

You know what I think, it’s a dual responsibility. I think the cause was him, and I think he looked at the — he looked at the TV a lot and saw that Morgan & Morgan doesn’t sue people, they sue companies.

Lyles’ counsel objected and moved to strike this portion of Smith’s testimony. The trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard Smith’s statement. Lyles’ attorney moved for a mistrial arguing that, when coupled with a juror’s proposed question asking when Lyles retained Morgan & Morgan, the jury had been improperly inflamed. Smith’s counsel responded that while the comment was not proper, the trial judge gave a curative instruction immediately after the spontaneous comment, the jury would take the court’s orders and instructions seriously, and that a mistrial was unwarranted. The trial court reserved ruling on the motion for mistrial.

During Dr. Scott’s testimony, he testified about the difference between biomechanical and medical opinions. Lyles’ counsel objected to Dr. Scott providing a medical causation opinion as to Lyles. The trial judge overruled Lyles’ objection but reiterated to Dr. Scott: “Dr. Scott, you’re not allowed to testify about whether Mr. Lyles is hurt; do you understand?” to which Dr. Scott answered, “Yes, I’m aware of that.”

After some deliberation, the court ultimately ruled, based on Maines v. Fox, 190 So. 3d 1135 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), that Dr. Scott could: (1) determine what forces would have impacted a person in Lyles’ vehicle in the accident; (2) provide specific acceleration rates in terms of G forces experienced because of the accident; and (3) equate the amount of force experienced in the accident to other experiences (e.g., dropping something on the floor from a certain height). The trial court prohibited Dr. Scott from testifying: (1) that significantly higher forces than the ones at work in the accident were necessary to cause Lyles’ injuries; or (2) that only an extremely fragile human being could have sustained an injury similar to that allegedly sustained by Lyles as a result of the accident.

During Dr. Scott’s testimony, Smith’s counsel played a five-second, rear-impact video that showed how an occupant moves in a rear-impact collision when the forces of the accident had a change in velocity of 5 mph — a change in velocity of 1.8 mph more severe than the forces in the subject accident, which caused a 3.2 mph change in velocity. Dr. Scott testified that the person sitting in the vehicle in the video was a test engineer who had “done these types of crashes before” and was “used to them.” Smith’s counsel then asked Dr. Scott whether the test subject in the video was injured, to which Dr. Scott responded, “No.”

Lyles’ counsel objected to this testimony and the trial court sustained the objection. Lyles’ counsel then moved for a mistrial, arguing that the question violated the court’s prior ruling in limine regarding the matters to which Dr. Scott was permitted to testify. The trial court reserved ruling on the motion.

After a three-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict of no liability. Lyles filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court granted. In its order, the trial court found that the Defendant’s testimony that Plaintiff was at fault and “spike stopped” because he’d seen advertisements run by Morgan and Morgan was outrageous in content and based on no evidence or law. The trial court also stated that Smith’s biomechanical expert, Dr. Scott, “violated the court’s order limiting [Dr. Scott] from giving medical causation testimony.” The trial court found that the improper testimony of Smith and Dr. Scott “were so prejudicial that their effect on the jury failed to be removed by an admonition of the Court to the jury.” As an additional basis for its ruling, the trial court found that the jury’s verdict of no liability was “contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, generally and in the specific ways such that the verdict is the clear and obvious product of the fact, that the jury was deceived as to the weight, force and credibility of the evidence, and was improperly influenced by prejudice, sympathy, mistake or other considerations outside the record.” Smith appealed the trial court’s order granting the motion for new trial.

The Sixth District began its analysis by summarizing the trial court’s three rationales:

As detailed above, the trial court cited three bases for its order granting the motion for new trial: (1) improper testimony by Smith; (2) a violation by Smith’s expert of the trial court’s order on a motion in limine; and (3) the jury’s verdict of no liability was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We will address each of these issues individually.

I. Improper Testimony by Smith.

The appellate court noted that the trial court found that the Defendant’s testimony that Plaintiff was at fault and “spike stopped” because he’d seen advertisements run by Morgan and Morgan was outrageous in content and based on no evidence or law. This finding, said the appellate court, was not supported by the record. The appellate court explained its reasoning:

While Smith made a statement concerning Morgan & Morgan during his testimony, the trial court’s order finds that Smith made a completely different statement than Smith actually made. Contrary to the trial court’s finding, at no time during the trial did Smith testify that Lyles stopped because he saw advertisements run by Morgan & Morgan. A trial court is not permitted to grant a motion for new trial based on improper witness testimony when the testimony cited by the trial court did not actually occur. Because the trial court’s finding regarding Smith’s testimony is not supported by the record, such finding was not a proper a basis for the trial court to grant the motion for new trial.

II. Violation of the Order on the Motion in Limine.

Turning to the second issue, the appellate court noted that it is reversible error for the trial court to order a new trial based on a violation of a ruling in limine where no such violation occurred. The appellate court noted that the trial court ruled that Dr. Scott could not testify: (1) about whether Lyles was hurt; (2) that significantly higher forces than the ones at work in the accident were necessary to cause Lyles’ injuries; or (3) that only an extremely fragile human being could have sustained an injury similar to that allegedly sustained by Lyles as a result of the accident.

At trial, Smith’s counsel played a 5-second video and then asked Dr. Scott, among other things, whether the test subject in the 5-second video was injured. Dr. Scott answered that question, “No.” The trial court found that this answer violated the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine, but, said the appellate court, it did not. Dr. Scott’s statement that the test subject in the video was not injured, said the appellate court, “simply did not violate any of the three prohibitions contained in the trial court’s ruling.” Because Dr. Scott’s testimony did not violate the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine, concluded the appellate court, the trial court abused its discretion by finding otherwise.

III. The Manifest Weight of the Evidence.

Turning to the third issue, the appellate court set out the law on deference to a trial court:

A trial court’s order granting a motion for a new trial on the ground that the jury’s verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, but “that discretion is neither absolute nor unreviewable.” Meyers v. Shontz, 251 So. 3d 992, 999-1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).

The deference the law grants a trial court granting a motion for new trial based on the manifest weight of the evidence does not … grant it a license to operate “as a super-juror by disregarding a jury’s verdict simply because the judge would have rendered a different one had it been the judge’s choice to make.”

Valenty v. Saraiva, 292 So. 3d 50, 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (quoting Meyers, 251 So. 3d at 999) (emphasis added).

Rather, said the appellate court, the trial court’s role is to assess the totality of the evidence presented at trial and intervene only when that evidence is manifestly weighted to the movant’s side.  In deciding whether the evidence manifestly weighs against the verdict, the trial court must examine all of the evidence—giving consideration to its weight and credibility.  Meyers, 251 So. 3d at 1000. Further:

If a trial court grants a new trial on the ground that the jury’s verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, “the trial court must state its reasons with specificity in a written order so that its decision can be effectively reviewed on appeal.” Valenty, 292 So. 3d at 54 (citing Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530(f); Prime Motor Inns, Inc. v. Waltman, 480 So. 2d 88, 89-90 (Fla. 1985)). “[I]t is well-settled that a trial court abuses its discretion when its reasons for granting a new trial are not supported by the record.” Hashmi-Alikhan v. Staples, 241 So. 3d 264, 268 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (citing Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 435-36 (Fla. 1978)).

In this case, said the appellate court, the only specific reason cited by the trial court for its finding that the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence was:

Given that the accident was a rear end accident with the Plaintiff having explained why he had to stop suddenly (vehicle entering the intersection), the Defendant having no factual reason for not stopping (Morgan and Morgan ads are not a legal cause under these facts) and that the Plaintiff was entitled to be examined at the emergency room thereafter the verdict of no liability and no causation requires a new trial.

As to the first portion of this sentence, said the appellate court, there was clearly conflicting testimony regarding Lyles’ explanation for why he had to stop. Lyles testified that after beginning to move forward, he looked to his left to check whether any vehicles were approaching in the lane into which he was turning. Lyles testified that as he looked left, he saw a red truck preparing to run a red light and change lanes into his path. Lyles testified that he stopped in order to avoid the oncoming red truck. Smith, on the other hand, testified that Lyles’ testimony was false and that there was no red truck approaching the intersection. Thus, said the appellate court, there was evidence directly contradicting Lyles’ testimony regarding his reason for stopping.

As to Smith having no factual reason for not stopping, the appellate court concluded this was also plainly contradicted by the record. Smith testified that as he began to move forward, he looked to his left to check for oncoming vehicles. While Smith was looking to his left, Lyles made a sudden “spike” stop and, although Smith slammed on his brakes, Smith could not stop in time. From this testimony, said the appellate court, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Smith acted reasonably and that, therefore, he was not negligent. Valenty, 292 So. 3d at 55 (stating that in order to find a defendant negligent, a jury must find that the defendant either did something that a reasonably careful person would not have done, or failed to do something that a reasonably careful person would have done in similar circumstances); Marcano v. Puhalovich, 362 So. 2d 439, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (“Plaintiff’s entitlement to recovery depends upon the existence of negligence by the defendant in the operation of his automobile. The mere occurrence of an accident does not give rise to an inference of negligence.”); Meyer v. Torrey, 452 So. 2d 672, 673 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (“It is still fundamental, of course, that the mere occurrence of an accident does not give rise to an inference of negligence, and is not sufficient for a finding of negligence on the part of anyone.”).

Additionally, reasoned the appellate court, even if Smith was negligent, the jury could also have found that Smith’s negligence was not the cause of any injuries to Lyles because there was ample evidence in the record, including testimony from multiple experts, from which a jury could have reasonably concluded that Lyles’ injuries were caused by his preexisting conditions rather than by the accident.

In sum, said the appellate court, in ruling that the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the trial court ignored conflicting testimony as to whether Smith was negligent and as to the cause of Lyles’ injuries. For this reason, said the appellate court, the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Conclusion

Finding that all three of the trial court’s bases for granting Lyles’ motion for new trial were not supported by the record, the Sixth District reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Smith in accordance with the jury’s verdict.