The Third District’s recent decision in A.B. v. Department of Children and Families (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 14, 2026) is a clear reminder of a hard but settled principle in Florida dependency law: parental rights are fundamental, but they are not abstract, and they are not preserved by biology alone.

The case affirms the termination of a father’s parental rights based on abandonment under sections 39.01(1) and 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes. What makes the opinion notable is not doctrinal novelty, but how methodically the court applies long-standing standards to a factual record that many parents—and lawyers—misunderstand.

The Factual Reality the Court Could Not Ignore

C.B. was born prematurely in January 2021 to a drug-dependent mother. From the outset, the father denied paternity and affirmatively declined to determine whether he was the child’s father. When the Department of Children and Families initiated shelter proceedings, he did not appear.

By the time the father surfaced—nearly a year later—the child had already been sheltered and placed with foster parents who would become the only caregivers the child ever knew. Even after paternity was confirmed, the father’s involvement remained sporadic and largely symbolic: limited virtual visits, two one-hour in-person visits, an abandoned plan to relocate to Florida, and a single child-support payment made ten months after support was ordered.

Against that backdrop, the foster parents filed their own termination petition alleging abandonment. The trial court agreed, and the Third District affirmed in full.

Abandonment Is About Conduct, Not Intent

Florida’s statutory definition of abandonment focuses on what a parent actually does, not what the parent later claims to have intended. A parent abandons a child by failing, while able, to make a meaningful contribution to the child’s care or to establish and maintain a substantial and positive relationship. Marginal efforts and token gestures are not enough.

Here, the court emphasized that the father’s own admissions were devastating to his case. He acknowledged that he did not consider the child’s welfare and offered inconsistent explanations for his prolonged absence. The trial court found his testimony not credible, a finding the appellate court properly refused to second-guess.

Importantly, the court reiterated that acknowledgment of paternity does not reset the abandonment clock. Delay matters—especially when the child’s early years are at issue.

The Least Restrictive Means Test Has Limits

Termination of parental rights requires more than proof of a statutory ground; it also requires proof that termination is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm. Parents often argue this prong as if it obligates the Department to exhaust every conceivable service or reunification effort.

The Third District rejected that framing.

Citing Padgett, Santosky, and more recent Florida Supreme Court authority, the court reaffirmed that due process requires fundamentally fair procedures, not infinite patience. Where there is no meaningful parent-child bond to preserve, and where reunification would itself cause harm by uprooting a child from the only stable home he has known, termination may be the least restrictive means.

As the court noted, the test is not whether a parent can interact with a child under controlled circumstances. The question is whether the parent can actually assume the responsibilities of parenting. Here, the record showed the father could not—and did not.

Best Interests Are Not a Tie-Breaker; They Are Central

The opinion also underscores how deferential appellate review is when it comes to a trial court’s best-interests findings. The trial court made findings on all eleven statutory factors, supported by testimony from the Guardian ad Litem, the Department, and the foster parents.

The evidence showed a child with significant medical and developmental needs who had thrived in a stable environment and formed a strong parental bond with the foster parents. Removing the child to attempt reunification with a biological parent who had never parented him was not a neutral act—it was an affirmative risk.

Florida law does not require courts to preserve a biological relationship at the expense of a child’s future.

The Larger Lesson

A.B. is not a close case, but it is an instructive one.

For parents, it is a cautionary reminder that delay, denial, and half-measures can permanently alter parental rights, even when a parent later expresses interest.

For practitioners, it reinforces the importance of developing a clear record on abandonment, credibility, bonding, and the real-world consequences of reunification.

And for anyone involved in dependency proceedings, the case reflects a consistent judicial theme: the law protects parental rights vigorously—but only when parents actually exercise them.

Biology opens the door.
Parenting is what keeps it open.