Wepard Corporation, Ltd. v. Diaz, Reus & Targ, LLP, 3D25-0252 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 21, 2026), is one of those procedural decisions that looks narrow on first read but carries outsized practical consequences—particularly for cross-border disputes involving closely held companies, international principals, and professional-services litigation.

At bottom, the Third District confirms that Florida trial courts have broad authority to permit service of process on foreign defendants by email under section 48.197(1)(c), Florida Statutes, without requiring plaintiffs to first exhaust Hague Convention procedures. For plaintiffs, this is a meaningful efficiency win. For foreign defendants—and their counsel—it is a warning shot.

This case matters because service is not just a technicality. Service determines timing, leverage, cost, and sometimes outcome.

The Dispute in Brief

Diaz, Reus & Targ, LLP sued its former clients—Wepard Corporation, Forsun Boats, and their principal, Nicolas Suarez—for unpaid legal fees. All defendants were located in Malta, making service subject to the Hague Convention.

Rather than initiating Hague service through Malta’s Central Authority, DRT moved early for court-authorized email service under section 48.197(1)(c), citing extensive prior email communications with Suarez. The trial court granted the motion. Service was completed by email.

The defendants moved to quash service, arguing that email service violated the Hague Convention and that DRT was required to show due diligence—i.e., to attempt Hague service first. The trial court disagreed. The Third District largely affirmed.

Two Threshold Rulings That Practitioners Should Not Miss

Before reaching the statutory interpretation issue, the court disposed of two arguments that routinely trip up defendants.

First, Suarez was out. Once DRT voluntarily dismissed him, Suarez lost standing to appeal the service order. Florida law is unforgiving on this point: a voluntary dismissal divests the court of jurisdiction, full stop.

Second, Forsun (and Suarez, before dismissal) waived their service objection by seeking affirmative relief—specifically sanctions and attorneys’ fees. Florida remains firmly in the “first step” camp: if a defendant wants to challenge jurisdiction or service, that challenge must come before seeking any relief that presumes the court’s authority.

For business litigants, this is not academic. Defensive motion sequencing matters. A premature sanctions motion can quietly surrender a jurisdictional defense.

No Due-Diligence Requirement for Foreign Email Service

The core holding is straightforward and consequential.

Section 48.197(1)(c) allows foreign service “[p]ursuant to motion and order by the court, by other means, including electronically by e-mail,” so long as the method is reasonably calculated to give actual notice and is not prohibited by international agreement.

Unlike Florida’s domestic alternative-service statute (section 48.102), the foreign-service statute contains no due-diligence requirement. The Third District treated that omission as intentional, applying standard principles of statutory construction: when the Legislature includes language in one section and omits it in another, courts do not read it back in.

The court also emphasized that section 48.197(1)(c) is modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3), which federal courts—including the Ninth Circuit in Rio Properties—have long held does not impose a hierarchy of service methods. Email service is not a “last resort.” It is one option among several.

Florida has now said the same, explicitly.

The Hague Convention Does Not Bar Email Service

Defendants argued that Malta’s objection to Article 10 of the Hague Convention barred email service. The Third District rejected that argument cleanly.

Article 10 addresses specific methods of direct service—postal channels and service through judicial officers. Email is not mentioned, for the simple reason that it did not exist in 1965. Neither the Hague Convention nor Malta expressly prohibits email service.

Florida courts, following federal authority, continue to draw a sharp distinction between what the Convention affirmatively regulates and what it does not prohibit. If a service method is court-ordered, reasonably calculated to provide notice, and not expressly barred by international agreement, it passes statutory muster—even if it contravenes the internal law of the foreign country.

That point often unsettles international clients. But it has been settled law in federal courts for years, and Florida has now aligned itself squarely with that approach.

Actual Notice Carries the Day

The opinion repeatedly returns to a practical touchstone: notice.

The defendants did not dispute receiving the emails. They appeared through counsel. They filed motions. Whatever theoretical objections existed, actual notice was undeniable.

For courts, this matters. Service rules exist to ensure notice and fairness—not to provide defendants with procedural escape hatches after they are fully aware of the litigation.

Why This Case Matters to Business Clients

For companies and principals operating internationally—particularly in professional-services relationships—Wepard changes the risk calculus.

First, geographic distance is no longer a reliable buffer against prompt Florida litigation. Email service can accelerate a case dramatically.

Second, jurisdictional skirmishing must be handled with precision. A single misstep can waive otherwise viable defenses.

Third, email communications matter. Regular business use of email with U.S. counterparties can later support court-ordered email service.

For law firms and other professional-services providers, the decision provides a clear roadmap for enforcing fee agreements against foreign clients without being trapped in months—or years—of Hague Convention delays.

The Larger Takeaway

Wepard is not about shortcuts. It is about alignment between modern business reality and procedural law.

Florida courts are signaling that international defendants who do business with Florida entities, communicate electronically, and receive actual notice should expect Florida litigation to proceed efficiently. Formalism will not override substance where notice is clear and statutory requirements are met.

For sophisticated litigants and counsel, that is not a surprise—but it is now binding precedent in Florida’s Third District.

And it is a reminder that in cross-border disputes, procedure is strategy.