In State v. Yanes-Blanco, the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed a deceptively simple question with significant consequences: does the act of “illegally entering the United States” end the moment a person physically crosses the border, or can it continue as that person is transported deeper into the country?

The court’s answer matters for how Florida’s human-smuggling statute is applied, especially in cases involving transportation from another state into Florida.

I. THE FACTS AS ALLEGED

According to the State, Florida Highway Patrol stopped a cargo van on Interstate 75 in Hernando County in April 2022. The van appeared overloaded, had dark tint, and bore Texas plates. Inside the cargo area were twenty passengers, some sitting on top of others, with little luggage or money. None possessed a valid U.S. driver’s license.

Law enforcement alleged that the occupants had recently crossed the southern border into Texas, stayed briefly in “stash houses,” and paid to be transported to the Orlando area. Some reportedly stated they would have to work to repay smugglers. The driver, Jean Paul Yanes-Blanco, allegedly possessed cash and documentation suggesting rapid travel eastward from Louisiana earlier that same day.

The State charged Yanes-Blanco with twenty counts of human smuggling under section 787.07(1), Florida Statutes (2022), plus a driving offense.

II. THE DISMISSAL AND THE CORE LEGAL THEORY

Before trial, Yanes-Blanco filed a motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4). That rule allows dismissal when the undisputed facts, even if true, do not establish a prima facie case.

The defense theory was straightforward: the passengers had already entered the United States when they crossed the border into Texas. Once that crossing occurred, the act of “entering” was complete. Transporting them from Texas into Florida therefore did not fall within the statute, which criminalized transporting someone who “is illegally entering the United States from another country.”

The trial court agreed and dismissed all twenty smuggling counts.

III. THE FIFTH DCA’S REVERSAL

The Fifth District reversed, holding that the trial court interpreted the statute too narrowly.

A. THE STATUTE FOCUSES ON THE TRANSPORTER

The court emphasized that section 787.07(1) targets the conduct of the smuggler, not the migrant. The crime is committed by a person who “transports into this state” an individual whom the transporter knows or should know is illegally entering the United States.

Framed that way, the statute is not asking courts to pinpoint a metaphysical instant when entry occurs. It asks whether the transporter is moving people into Florida as part of an illegal entry process.

B. “IS ENTERING” DESCRIBES A CONTINUING PROCESS

Central to the court’s reasoning was the Legislature’s use of the present progressive tense: “is illegally entering.” In ordinary usage, that tense denotes an ongoing course of conduct, not a completed act.

The court rejected the analogy that entry is like stepping through a doorway—instantaneous and complete once crossed. In the immigration context, the court reasoned, entry can be a process that continues as individuals are moved from the border toward their intended interior destination.

C. ENTRY DOES NOT NECESSARILY END AT THE BORDER

Drawing on widely recognized immigration principles, the court explained that unlawful entry into the United States is often treated as continuing until the individual is free from restraint and reaches a place of destination within the country. Under the State’s allegations, the passengers’ journey did not end at the Texas border; it continued through multiple states toward Orlando.

Because the alleged transportation into Florida occurred while that entry process was ongoing, the State had alleged conduct that fell within the statute.

IV. WHY LENITY DID NOT SAVE THE DEFENSE

The defendant argued that, at a minimum, any ambiguity should be resolved in his favor under the rule of lenity.

The Fifth DCA rejected that argument. Lenity applies only after traditional tools of statutory interpretation fail to resolve ambiguity. Here, the court concluded that the text, verb tense, and statutory context resolved the issue without ambiguity. Once that interpretive work was done, lenity had no role to play.

V. WHAT THE CASE DOES — AND DOES NOT — DECIDE

It is important to understand what Yanes-Blanco is, and is not.

First, it is a pleading-stage decision. The court did not find guilt or rule on the sufficiency of proof at trial. It held only that the State’s allegations, if proven, are legally sufficient to proceed.

Second, the court did not decide federal preemption issues. The concurrence noted that similar state immigration-related laws have faced preemption challenges in federal court, but those issues were not preserved in this case and therefore were not decided.

Third, the statute at issue has since been amended. The version applied in Yanes-Blanco was the 2022 statute. Later amendments changed the wording and elements of the offense. Any analysis in a future case must start with the version of the statute in effect on the date of the alleged conduct.

VI. PRACTICAL TAKEAWAYS

Yanes-Blanco has immediate consequences for Florida criminal cases involving alleged smuggling routes that pass through other states before entering Florida.

A defense theory that relies solely on the fact that migrants crossed the border somewhere other than Florida is unlikely to support early dismissal when the State alleges a continuous transportation effort culminating in Florida.

For prosecutors, the decision supports charging and litigating smuggling as a continuous offense that does not end at the border.

For defense counsel, the focus will often shift to other elements—knowledge, intent, the nature and purpose of the transportation, and preservation of federal constitutional and preemption arguments.

At a broader level, the case reflects a judicial preference for reading criminal statutes according to ordinary grammar and context, rather than narrowing them based on rigid, moment-in-time concepts that the statutory language does not clearly adopt.

The bottom line: in Florida, at least under the pre-amendment statute, “entering the United States” is not necessarily over just because the border is behind you.