by Jeffrey T. Donner, Esq.

Florida family cases often settle through marital settlement agreements (MSAs), parenting plans, and mediated stipulations. Many clients assume that once an agreement is signed and “made part of the final judgment,” every provision will be enforced exactly as written. Florida appellate law is more nuanced.

A series of Florida decisions—including Antunes v. Oliveira (3d DCA), Palmer v. Palmer (1st DCA), Godwin v. Godwin (4th DCA), and Pagliaro v. Pagliaro (4th DCA)—collectively frame the modern enforcement landscape. The short version:

1. Financial enforcement provisions in MSAs (including agreed “fixed sums” triggered by noncompliance) are often enforceable once incorporated into a final judgment.
2. Child-related provisions are always subject to the court’s independent best-interests review, even if parents agreed.
3. Contempt is not a free-for-all: the underlying order must be clear and precise, the conduct must clearly violate it, and due process requires a meaningful opportunity to present evidence.
4. Courts cannot “rewrite” parenting provisions or create new restrictions without proper pleadings; “clarifications” can cross the line into improper modifications.
5. Attorney’s fees provisions in agreements are frequently enforced as written—sometimes with little or no discretion for the trial court.

This article explains the rules, how they fit together, and what they mean for parents and families trying to prevent repeated conflict—especially in high-friction co-parenting situations.

I. FINANCIAL ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS: WHY “FIXED SUMS” OF MONEY OFTEN SURVIVE

A. The “no collateral attack” principle once the agreement is in the judgment (Palmer)

Palmer v. Palmer involved a supplemental agreement requiring the former husband to pay a stipulated sum for delay in refinancing the marital home. The former husband tried to defend an enforcement proceeding by arguing the payment provision was an unenforceable penalty.

The First District did not decide whether the clause was valid liquidated damages or an invalid penalty. Instead, it relied on finality: a contractual damages-for-delay provision is not void as a matter of law (at most, voidable). And an agreement that is merely voidable is not subject to collateral challenge after it has been incorporated into the final judgment, absent proper direct attack procedures (appeal, motion to vacate, etc.). The key practical takeaway is that once the court incorporates a negotiated provision into a final judgment, a later “this is a penalty” defense may fail as an impermissible collateral attack.

Palmer also includes a notable partial dissent. The dissent raised the public-policy concern that illegal penalty clauses should not be enforced simply because they were “sheltered” inside a judgment. That debate matters, but the controlling decision in Palmer is the majority’s finality analysis.

B. The “family-law bargain” principle: parties can agree to obligations the court could not impose (Antunes; Godwin)

Antunes v. Oliveira applied Palmer’s logic in a parenting-related context, at least as to the money component. The MSA required seven days’ written notice before international travel, and imposed a $10,000 payment if a parent traveled without the required notice. The trial court refused to enforce it, calling it an unenforceable penalty.

The Third District reversed that portion. It held the $10,000 payment provision was enforceable after incorporation into the final judgment and rejected the trial court’s penalty analysis under the circumstances presented. The court emphasized that parties in dissolution proceedings may agree to obligations a court could not order absent agreement. That principle also appears in Godwin v. Godwin, where the Fourth District reaffirmed that parties are free to contract for obligations (including enforcement mechanisms like fees provisions) beyond what a judge could impose unilaterally.

C. Practical implications for parents and families

1. If you sign it and it gets incorporated, do not assume you can later litigate “penalty” as a defense.
2. If you want predictability and leverage, carefully drafted financial consequences—especially for repeated noncompliance—can be powerful and enforceable.
3. Because enforceability can turn on what was incorporated and when, the timing and procedural posture matter. If you believe a provision is unlawful or unconscionable, you generally need to raise it through the correct procedural vehicle (not as an after-the-fact defense in enforcement).

II. CHILD-RELATED PROVISIONS: THE BEST-INTERESTS STANDARD OVERRIDES PRIVATE AGREEMENTS

A. Courts cannot abdicate responsibility for the child (Pagliaro; Antunes)

Florida law draws a bright line: when a provision affects the child, the court must independently evaluate the child’s best interests. Parents cannot contract around that judicial duty.

Pagliaro v. Pagliaro is a clean example. A trial court ratified a mediation agreement involving time-sharing without permitting testimony and without showing that the child’s best interests were considered. The Fourth District reversed, emphasizing that even if parents agree, the court must still determine whether custody/time-sharing terms serve the child’s best interests.

Antunes reached a similar destination on the non-monetary sanction: the MSA also attempted to impose a blanket prohibition on future international travel with the child until the child reached majority. The trial court found that enforcing that travel ban was not in the child’s best interests. The Third District affirmed the refusal to enforce that child-affecting sanction.

B. The “split enforcement” concept: money can be enforced; child restrictions may not be

Antunes is especially important because it illustrates the dual-track approach Florida courts will take:

• A negotiated monetary consequence payable from one parent to the other may be enforced as a contract/judgment obligation.
• A sweeping parenting restriction (like a blanket travel ban) may be rejected if it conflicts with the child’s best interests.

Parents should understand that courts may enforce parts of an agreement and reject other parts, depending on whether a provision directly affects the child’s welfare.

C. Practical implications for international travel clauses and parenting plans

International travel is a frequent flashpoint, especially in cases involving dual citizenship or extended family abroad. The practical drafting lesson from Antunes is:

• Use notice requirements, documentation requirements, itinerary disclosures, passport-control mechanisms, and financial consequences for violations.
• Be cautious with “automatic,” long-term parenting restrictions (like lifetime bans) that a judge may later find contrary to the child’s best interests.

III. CONTEMPT IS A HIGHER BAR THAN “ENFORCEMENT”: CLARITY, WILLFULNESS, AND DUE PROCESS

A. No contempt unless the order clearly prohibits the conduct (Godwin)

Godwin v. Godwin addresses a problem that arises constantly in high-conflict cases: one party asks the judge to punish behavior that the court order does not actually prohibit. The Fourth District reiterated that contempt requires clear and precise language in the underlying order. A judge cannot base contempt on “implied” requirements or on what the judge thinks the order “meant.”

Godwin reversed a contempt finding where the order did not clearly prohibit the alleged conduct. The decision emphasizes two practical realities:

1. If the order is vague, contempt may be unavailable even if the behavior feels wrong.
2. If you want contempt as an enforcement tool, the underlying language must be explicit.

B. Courts cannot “clarify” an agreement into a new restriction without proper pleadings (Godwin)

Godwin also draws a procedural line between interpretation and modification. The trial court attempted to “clarify” a term regarding a parent’s “designee” transporting the children, effectively restricting what the designee could do. The Fourth District treated this as an improper modification because there was no proper petition for modification and the relief was not properly requested and tried.

This matters because trial courts sometimes attempt to solve a practical dispute by adding new limitations in the name of “clarification.” Godwin teaches that the parties are entitled to notice and proper pleading when the court’s order functionally changes the agreement.

C. Due process requires a meaningful opportunity to present evidence (Pagliaro)

Pagliaro reinforces that family courts must allow parties to present relevant testimony and evidence, particularly when time-sharing or child welfare is implicated. A judge cannot simply ratify an agreement or deny a motion to set aside without allowing a meaningful opportunity to be heard on material issues.

IV. ATTORNEY’S FEES IN ENFORCEMENT LITIGATION: OFTEN ENFORCED AS WRITTEN (Godwin)

Clients are often surprised to learn that many attorney’s fees provisions in family agreements are enforced like ordinary contract clauses. In Godwin, the parties’ stipulations included language requiring the violating party to pay 100% of fees incurred to establish a violation. The trial court denied fees even though it found a violation. The Fourth District reversed, explaining that clear fee provisions are generally enforced and trial courts do not have broad discretion to ignore them where the agreement’s terms are unambiguous.

Practical takeaway: if your agreement includes a fee-shifting provision (especially a strongly worded one), it can significantly change the economics of enforcement litigation.

V. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: WHAT THESE CASES MEAN IN REAL LIFE

A. If you want enforceability, draft like enforcement will be necessary

Well-drafted agreements anticipate noncompliance. These cases collectively suggest that the most enforceable tools tend to be:

• Clear, objective notice requirements (who, what, when, how)
• Concrete documentation requirements (itinerary, flight numbers, lodging, contact info)
• Deadlines stated with precision
• Fee-shifting provisions that are explicit and unambiguous
• Reasonable, negotiated financial consequences for specific violations

B. If a provision affects the child, expect judicial review no matter what you signed

Even a perfectly drafted clause can be rejected if it operates as a blanket restriction on the child’s welfare or time-sharing interests. Courts will enforce adult-to-adult financial terms more readily than child-affecting “automatic” sanctions.

C. Contempt is not guaranteed; it is a specialized remedy

If your goal is contempt, you must have:

• A clear order with explicit commands
• Proof of violation
• Proof of willfulness (where required)
• A process that satisfies due process

Many enforcement disputes are better framed as motions to enforce specific terms (and obtain fees where permitted) rather than banking on contempt as the primary remedy.

VI. CONCLUSION

Florida appellate courts are sending a consistent message:

• Agreements incorporated into final judgments carry real weight, especially on financial terms, fees, and negotiated enforcement mechanisms.
• But when children are involved, courts retain independent authority and responsibility to ensure outcomes align with the child’s best interests.
• And when a party seeks contempt or a court attempts to “clarify” an agreement into a new restriction, the law demands precision, proper pleadings, and due process.

For families, the practical point is simple: good drafting and smart enforcement strategy are not luxuries. They are the difference between a stable post-divorce framework and years of repeated conflict.