Florida family cases often settle through marital settlement agreements (MSAs), parenting plans, and mediated stipulations. Many people assume that once an agreement is signed and incorporated into a final judgment, every provision will be enforced exactly as written. Florida appellate law is more nuanced.

A series of Florida decisions—including Antunes v. Oliveira (3d DCA), Palmer v. Palmer (1st DCA), Godwin v. Godwin (4th DCA), and Pagliaro v. Pagliaro (4th DCA)—collectively frame the enforcement landscape:

1. Financial enforcement provisions in MSAs (including agreed “fixed sums” triggered by noncompliance) are often enforceable once incorporated into a final judgment.
2. Child-related provisions are always subject to the court’s independent best-interests review, even if parents agreed.
3. Contempt is not a free-for-all: the underlying order must be clear and precise, the conduct must clearly violate it, and due process requires a meaningful opportunity to present evidence.
4. Courts cannot “rewrite” parenting provisions or create new restrictions without proper pleadings; “clarifications” can cross the line into improper modifications.
5. Attorney’s fees provisions in agreements are frequently enforced as written.

This article explains those rules, how they fit together, and how they apply in the real world—especially when international travel, passports, and abduction-risk concerns enter the picture.

I. FINANCIAL ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS: WHY “FIXED SUMS” OF MONEY OFTEN SURVIVE

A. The “no collateral attack” principle once the agreement is in the judgment (Palmer)

In Palmer v. Palmer, the parties’ supplemental agreement (incorporated into a supplemental judgment) required the former husband to pay a stipulated sum for delay in refinancing the marital home. When enforcement was sought, he argued the payment provision was an unenforceable penalty.

The First District did not decide whether the clause was valid liquidated damages or an invalid penalty. Instead, it relied on finality: a damages-for-delay provision is not void as a matter of law (at most, voidable), and a voidable term is generally not subject to collateral challenge after it has been incorporated into a final judgment. In practical terms: if you want to attack the legality of a negotiated damages provision, you usually must do it directly (appeal/motion to vacate), not as a defense when enforcement comes due.

Palmer includes a noteworthy partial dissent suggesting that truly illegal penalty clauses should be unenforceable as a matter of public policy even after incorporation, but the controlling decision emphasizes the finality/collateral-attack rule.

B. The “family-law bargain” principle: parties can agree to obligations the court could not impose (Antunes; Godwin)

Antunes v. Oliveira applied Palmer’s logic in a parenting-related dispute, at least as to the money component. The MSA required seven days’ written notice before international travel and imposed a $10,000 payment for noncompliance. The trial court refused to enforce the $10,000, calling it an unenforceable penalty.

The Third District reversed that portion and held the $10,000 payment provision enforceable after incorporation into the final judgment. The opinion underscores a recurring principle in Florida family law: parties may agree to obligations a judge could not impose absent agreement—particularly financial obligations between the adults—so long as those terms do not directly undermine the court’s responsibility to the child.

Godwin v. Godwin likewise reflects the judiciary’s willingness to enforce what the parties actually wrote—especially when the agreement’s text is clear and incorporated into court orders.

C. Practical implications

1. If you sign it and it gets incorporated, do not assume you can later litigate “penalty” as a defense in an enforcement proceeding.
2. Properly drafted, objectively triggered financial consequences can create meaningful compliance incentives.
3. Procedural posture matters. If a party believes a provision is unlawful/unconscionable, the safest course is to challenge it through the correct direct mechanism rather than waiting for enforcement.

II. CHILD-RELATED PROVISIONS: THE BEST-INTERESTS STANDARD OVERRIDES PRIVATE AGREEMENTS

A. Courts cannot abdicate responsibility for the child (Pagliaro; Antunes)

Florida appellate courts repeatedly hold that when a provision affects custody/time-sharing or the child’s welfare, the court must independently evaluate best interests. Parents cannot contract around that duty.

Pagliaro v. Pagliaro reversed a trial court that ratified a mediated time-sharing arrangement without allowing testimony and without demonstrating an independent best-interests evaluation.

Antunes illustrates the same principle through a “split enforcement” outcome: the court enforced the money consequence but affirmed refusal to enforce a blanket child-affecting restriction.

B. The “split enforcement” concept: money can be enforced; child restrictions may not be

In Antunes, the MSA also attempted to impose a blanket prohibition on future international travel with the child until the child reached majority. The trial court found that enforcing that travel ban was not in the child’s best interests, and the Third District affirmed that refusal. The key point: Florida courts may enforce adult-to-adult financial remedies while rejecting a parenting restriction that is not in the child’s best interests.

III. CONTEMPT IS A HIGHER BAR THAN “ENFORCEMENT”: CLARITY, WILLFULNESS, AND DUE PROCESS

A. No contempt unless the order clearly prohibits the conduct (Godwin)

Godwin is essential for litigators: a judge cannot hold someone in contempt for violating “what the order meant.” The language must be clear and precise, and the conduct must clearly violate what the order actually says. Courts cannot base contempt on implied duties or unwritten assumptions.

For practitioners, this is where “real litigation” meets family court reality: contempt is a rule-of-law remedy. If the order is vague, your first step may be to seek a clarifying/enforcement order that makes expectations explicit going forward—rather than expecting contempt to carry the day on ambiguous text.

B. Courts cannot “clarify” an agreement into a new restriction without proper pleadings (Godwin)

Godwin also draws the line between interpretation and modification. The trial court attempted to “clarify” a transport/designee provision by effectively adding restrictions not found in the written agreement. The Fourth District treated that as an improper modification because the relief was not properly requested through pleadings (and the issue was not properly tried by consent).

C. Due process requires a meaningful opportunity to present evidence (Pagliaro)

Pagliaro highlights a practical appellate vulnerability in high-stakes parenting disputes: when a judge shuts down testimony or refuses to allow a party to present relevant evidence on child welfare, the resulting order is at risk on procedural due process grounds.

IV. INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL AND PASSPORTS: WHERE AGREEMENTS, FEDERAL PASSPORT RULES, AND FLORIDA “ABDUCTION-PREVENTION” REMEDIES INTERSECT

International travel disputes are not just “parenting plan squabbles.” They often involve (1) federal passport issuance rules, (2) the practical risk of non-return, and (3) the court’s continuing duty to protect the child’s best interests.

Antunes is a useful template because it separates three distinct issues that frequently get conflated in trial courts:

1. Passport access/consent (so a child can obtain travel documents).
2. Notice and transparency (itinerary, dates, flight info, contact info).
3. Remedies for noncompliance (financial sanctions vs. parenting restrictions).

A. Minor passports: consent is a federal issue, and the “consent problem” is predictable

As a baseline, the U.S. Department of State generally requires parental consent for issuance of a minor’s passport. The governing regulation is 22 C.F.R. § 51.28 (Minors).

In practice, if one parent cannot appear, the Department of State uses a notarized “Statement of Consent” (Form DS-3053) in many situations.

This is why many parenting plans and MSAs include provisions requiring a parent to cooperate with passport applications and execute necessary documents. Those clauses are not “extra.” They are often the only way to avoid one parent effectively vetoing travel by refusing to sign.

B. Antunes: a court order can remove “consent-to-issue” obstacles, but it does not automatically eliminate notice obligations

Antunes involved an MSA that required advance notice of international travel and set consequences for violating that notice requirement. Later, a 2019 order authorized the mother to obtain a passport and travel internationally “without the necessity” of the father executing documents or giving consent—an order aimed at preventing passport hostage-taking.

The key nuance in Antunes is that the trial court’s “passport/travel authorization” order did not necessarily erase the separate MSA obligation to provide advance notice of international travel. Antunes is therefore a strong reminder to practitioners: passport authorization and travel notice are different concepts. One can exist without the other, and courts should analyze them separately.

C. Florida’s statutory toolkit: travel restrictions, passport surrender, and even bonds (Fla. Stat. § 61.45)

When there is evidence of a credible risk that a party may remove a child from Florida or the United States (or conceal the child), Florida law gives courts a menu of abduction-prevention remedies.

Section 61.45 authorizes a court, upon competent substantial evidence of risk, to impose restrictions such as: prohibiting removal from the state or country without notarized permission or court order; requiring surrender of the child’s passports; requiring enrollment in federal passport alert mechanisms; prohibiting new passport applications; restricting travel to non-Hague countries in certain circumstances; and requiring a bond or other security as a deterrent, with proceeds potentially usable to fund recovery efforts.

This statute matters in international travel disputes because it shifts the conversation from generalized fear (“She might not return”) to targeted, court-recognized tools designed to manage that risk.

D. Hague Convention realities: “Hague country” is helpful, but it is not a magic wand

International travel risk analysis often includes whether the destination country is a Hague Abduction Convention treaty partner. Colombia has been a Hague treaty partner with the United States since June 1, 1996.

That can be relevant to judicial decision-making and to the structure of travel safeguards. But a Hague remedy is still litigation—often expensive, time-sensitive, and uncertain in outcome. Courts and counsel should therefore treat Hague status as one factor, not a guarantee of protection.

E. Drafting and enforcement guardrails that judges tend to understand

When a parent seeks to travel internationally with a child, well-drafted orders typically separate the “permission” question from the “conditions” question. Conditions commonly include:

1. Written notice within a defined time window (often 30+ days for international travel, but the number should be case-specific).
2. Full itinerary, flight details, lodging addresses, and reliable contact information.
3. Copies of travel documents (passport bio page; tickets; any visa documentation).
4. Defined return date, with school calendar considerations.
5. Provisions governing possession/control of the passport when travel is not imminent (including surrender to counsel or a neutral).
6. Prohibitions on applying for replacement passports or foreign passports without written agreement or court order (where appropriate).
7. Fee shifting and objectively defined consequences for violations (keeping in mind Antunes’ “split enforcement” framework).

Antunes shows why this works: it reduces the dispute to objective compliance and reduces the court’s temptation to improvise.

V. ATTORNEY’S FEES IN ENFORCEMENT LITIGATION: OFTEN ENFORCED AS WRITTEN (Godwin)

Godwin is also a warning shot on fees: where the parties’ agreements unambiguously require fee shifting to the prevailing/enforcing party (or require fees upon proof of violation), trial courts often have limited discretion to deny fees. A strong fee provision changes the litigation economics and can deter repeated noncompliance.

VI. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: WHAT THIS MEANS FOR HIGH-CONFLICT ENFORCEMENT CASES

For lawyers representing a parent who alleges repeated violations—missed time-sharing, interference with communication (including video calls), disparagement, and safety concerns—two practical points flow directly from these cases:

1. Contempt is a precision remedy. Your contempt theory must map cleanly onto clear, explicit order language (Godwin). If the order is mushy, your enforcement strategy may need a two-step approach: enforce/clarify first, then pursue contempt for continued violations after the line is bright.
2. International travel disputes should be framed in structured, court-recognized terms: passport mechanics (federal consent realities), notice/transparency, and risk-management tools under Fla. Stat. § 61.45—rather than only arguing motives or fear.

VII. CONCLUSION

Florida appellate law is consistent on the big picture:

• Agreements incorporated into final judgments carry real weight, especially on financial terms, fees, and negotiated enforcement mechanisms (Palmer; Antunes; Godwin).
• But when children are involved, courts retain independent authority and responsibility to ensure outcomes align with the child’s best interests (Pagliaro; Antunes).
• And when a party seeks contempt—or when a court attempts to “clarify” an agreement into a new restriction—Florida law demands precision, proper pleadings, and due process (Godwin; Pagliaro).

International travel disputes are where these principles collide in real life. The strongest approach is almost always a structured one: clear orders, objective travel safeguards, enforceable adult-to-adult remedies, and—where risk is supported by evidence—targeted statutory protections designed for exactly this scenario.