By Jeffrey T. Donner, Esq.

When a family believes a divorce settlement was infected by hidden assets or fraud, the instinct is often to focus on the merits: What was concealed? Who knew? How much money is missing? But Florida appellate courts regularly remind litigants that you do not get to the merits unless you get the procedure right.

In Schneiderman v. Baer, 334 So. 3d 326 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022), the Fourth District reversed a dismissal of a fraud-based attack on a 2009 dissolution judgment—not because the appellate court validated the fraud theory, but because the trial court used the wrong procedural vehicle. The decision is a clear warning: a motion to dismiss is not a substitute for summary judgment, and a trial court cannot short-circuit the pleading stage by relying on outside materials (even if those materials come from related litigation).

The opinion also draws an important line on standing. Not everyone in the family tree has the right to challenge a divorce decree, even if they believe it affected inheritances and later estate disputes.

The Family Dispute Behind the Litigation

This case arose out of a 2009 divorce between Lenore and Irvin Tepper after a 57-year marriage. They settled by a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) with an attached spreadsheet reflecting roughly $13.2 million in marital assets and no liabilities. The final judgment incorporated the MSA and recited that it was “facially fair” and entered “after full disclosure.”

Both spouses later died. The litigation then became a dispute between two branches of descendants—one aligned with Lenore (the Schneiderman side) and one aligned with Irvin (the Baer side). The central accusation was severe: Irvin allegedly committed fraud in the divorce by failing to disclose more than $2 million in marital assets and by securing a final judgment without filing a financial affidavit.

What Was Actually on Appeal

The appeal did not decide whether fraud occurred. It decided whether the case was dismissed correctly at the pleading stage.

The petitioners filed a lengthy petition seeking equitable relief to set aside the dissolution judgment (or aspects of it) based on “fraud on the court” and related theories, invoking Rule 1.540 and Family Law Rule 12.540 concepts. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing—among other things—that the claims were untimely and barred by estoppel based on positions and settlements in related litigation.

The motion to dismiss relied heavily on materials outside the four corners of the petition: deposition testimony from a will contest, pleadings and orders from other cases, and a settlement agreement resolving earlier litigation.

The trial court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice, explicitly relying on judicial notice of those related proceedings to rule (a) the claims were time-barred, (b) the estate and a granddaughter were estopped, and (c) the granddaughter lacked standing.

The Big Procedural Holding: The “Four Corners” Rule Still Matters

The Fourth District reversed the dismissal as to the personal representative of Lenore’s estate because the trial court relied on matters outside the petition when ruling on a motion to dismiss.

Florida’s pleading rule is straightforward: on a motion to dismiss, the court evaluates the complaint (and its attachments) and assumes the pleaded facts are true, drawing reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. A court generally may not consider depositions, testimony, prior-case filings, or other external evidence to decide disputed factual defenses like timeliness or estoppel at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

The appellate court emphasized a practical point that gets lost in real litigation: deciding a case based on “undisputed facts” is the job of summary judgment (or trial), not a motion to dismiss. Even when a defendant believes the outside record proves the case is time-barred or estopped, the proper mechanism is typically summary judgment—where evidence can be considered and the opposing party has a fair procedural opportunity to contest it.

The court also rejected an overbroad use of “incorporation by reference.” Merely mentioning other proceedings does not open the door to the trial court considering the entire record of those proceedings to dismiss a case.

Standing: A Grandchild Could Not Challenge the Divorce Decree

Although the Fourth District reversed the dismissal as to the personal representative, it affirmed dismissal as to Montana Queler, the granddaughter.

The court held that, as a non-party to the dissolution and not an intended third-party beneficiary of the MSA, she lacked standing to set aside or modify the final judgment of dissolution.

The court acknowledged that Florida law recognizes a limited circumstance in which lineal descendants can challenge a divorce judgment that is attempted to be enforced against them in a way that adversely affects their rights. The case often cited for that proposition is In re Kant’s Estate. But the Fourth District distinguished it: Kant’s Estate involved a void divorce decree affecting inheritance rights. Here, the petition did not claim the entire divorce judgment was void; it sought to maintain the legal divorce while attacking aspects of the MSA and judgment. That was not enough to confer standing on the granddaughter.

This part of the opinion is an important reminder for multi-generational estate and family disputes: even if later litigation is fundamentally “about the divorce,” only certain parties have legal authority to attack the divorce judgment itself.

Timeliness: The Fourth District Did Not Decide It—But Put Everyone on Notice

The defendants’ timeliness arguments did not disappear. The Fourth District held that timeliness could not be decided on a motion to dismiss based on outside materials. On remand, the defendants remain free to challenge timeliness on summary judgment or at trial, using applicable statutes of limitation and common-law principles.

The opinion gives pointed guidance on how that fight should proceed: timeliness may turn on when the basis for fraud was discovered (or should have been discovered) and whether the claim was pursued “as soon as reasonably possible” after discovery—concepts that are often fact-intensive and ill-suited to dismissal at the pleading stage unless the petition itself conclusively establishes untimeliness.

A Note About Financial Affidavits and Rule 12.540

The petition alleged, in substance, that Irvin engineered a settlement process that avoided filing the financial affidavit typically required in dissolution cases, substituting a distribution spreadsheet and using that to understate assets.

The Fourth District included an important observation about procedure: to the extent a party relies on Family Law Rule 12.540(b) “no time limit” language, that rule is generally understood to apply to a motion for relief filed in the original dissolution action—not an independent action filed years later attacking part of the judgment. The court noted that reading the rule as eliminating limitation periods for independent actions would raise serious separation-of-powers concerns because statutes of limitation are largely legislative policy choices.

Why This Decision Matters

This case matters less for what it says about hidden assets (it does not resolve that) and more for what it says about how these cases must be litigated.

First, procedural discipline controls outcomes. If a trial court dismisses a case by relying on outside evidence, that is a reversible error in most circumstances. If the defense depends on evidence, the proper vehicle is typically summary judgment.

Second, standing is not “family-wide.” Personal representatives may have standing where other relatives do not. A grandchild’s sense of injustice is not enough; the law requires a direct legal relationship to the judgment or agreement being attacked.

Third, the “timeliness” battle usually gets decided later, not at the pleading stage. Many fraud-on-the-court and extrinsic fraud theories live or die on when the facts were known, what was discoverable, and what actions were taken thereafter. Those are evidentiary questions.

Practical Takeaways

1. Choose the right procedural vehicle.
If the defense requires depositions, settlement agreements, or records from other cases, expect the fight to move to summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss.

2. Confirm standing early.
Before investing heavily, identify who has legal authority to pursue relief—often the estate’s personal representative rather than individual descendants.

3. Treat timeliness as a core merits risk.
Even if a claim survives dismissal, these cases frequently turn on delay, knowledge, and diligence. Build the record with that in mind from day one.

Conclusion

Schneiderman v. Baer is a modern example of a classic appellate theme: procedure is substance. The Fourth District did not bless the fraud allegations, but it enforced the rules that govern how allegations must be tested. For parties litigating long-tail disputes that spill from divorce into probate, trusts, and multi-front civil litigation, the case is a roadmap—and a warning—about standing, pleading-stage limits, and the inevitable importance of timing.