By Jeffrey T. Donner, Esq.

High-asset divorce litigation often turns on issues that look “financial,” but are actually legal: what remedies are authorized by statute, what income must be considered, and what a trial court may (and may not) do in the name of “fairness.” The First District’s decision in Iarussi v. Iarussi, 353 So. 3d 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022), is one of the more important Florida family law opinions in recent years for lawyers handling business-owner divorces, valuation disputes, and cases involving substantial liquid investments.

The opinion does three practical things. It (1) rejects prejudgment interest on equitable distribution awards as unauthorized by section 61.075; (2) reinforces that investment income generally must be considered (and often imputed) in alimony analysis; and (3) includes concurring opinions that raise issues sophisticated practitioners should not ignore—particularly the statutory foundation (or lack thereof) for “retroactive alimony.”

BACKGROUND: A BUSINESS VALUATION DIVORCE WITH REAL MONEY AT STAKE

The former husband founded LobbyTools, a successful company. Many of his shares were acquired before the marriage, but they appreciated substantially during the marriage—placing valuation and marital appreciation front and center. Both spouses held executive roles during the marriage, and the case featured the familiar hallmarks of high-net-worth dissolution litigation: competing valuation experts, significant liquidity and investment holdings, and a wide disparity in ongoing earned income.

By trial, most issues were resolved by agreement, but key claims remained for adjudication:

– valuation and distribution of the parties’ marital interest in LobbyTools;
– alimony (including retroactive and prospective durational alimony); and
– fees and costs.

The trial court credited the former wife’s valuation expert, ordered a cash equalization payment of $1,709,141, added prejudgment interest retroactive to the petition date, and awarded both durational alimony and a lump-sum retroactive alimony award.

On appeal, the First District affirmed in part, but reversed on issues that materially affect settlement value and trial exposure in similar cases.

1) PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION: THE FIRST DISTRICT SAYS “NO”

The headline holding is simple and consequential: section 61.075 does not authorize prejudgment (retroactive) interest on equitable distribution.

Florida’s equitable distribution statute expressly contemplates interest in one particular situation—when distribution is paid over time. Section 61.075(10)(b) authorizes security and a reasonable rate of interest (or recognition of the time value of money) when payments are structured in installments.

But the statute is silent on prejudgment interest.

Some courts—most notably the Fourth District in Catalfumo—had previously permitted prejudgment interest by analogy to tort and contract principles, on the theory that interest compensates a party for the lost use of funds.

The First District rejected that analogy. Equitable distribution is not a damages award for a “wrongful deprivation.” Marital property is jointly owned during the marriage. Until entry of the final judgment, neither spouse has a fixed entitlement to a specific sum. Therefore, the doctrinal justification for prejudgment interest in tort and contract cases does not translate cleanly into equitable distribution.

Bottom line: the trial court’s award of prejudgment interest on the $1.7 million equalization payment was reversed.

For lawyers advising business owners and high-net-worth clients, that single holding can shift the economics of a case dramatically—particularly where litigation takes years, valuation is contested, and the cash equalization payment is large.

2) ALIMONY AND INVESTMENT INCOME: CREDIBILITY DOES NOT ELIMINATE THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT

The second major reversal concerned alimony.

The trial court rejected the husband’s investment expert as not credible and imputed no investment income to the former wife, despite evidence that her investments could generate substantial returns.

The First District agreed with the general proposition that a trial court may reject expert testimony based on credibility. But it also emphasized a separate and controlling requirement: section 61.08(2)(i) requires consideration of “all sources of income,” including investment income available through assets held by the party.

Florida case law has long recognized that courts should impute income reasonably available from liquid assets. Even when the expert’s rate-of-return testimony is rejected, a trial court must still address investment income in a rational way; imputing zero without sufficient explanation is reversible error.

Accordingly, the First District reversed and remanded both the durational and retroactive alimony awards for recalculation.

3) THE CONCURRENCES: TWO WARNINGS PRACTITIONERS SHOULD READ CAREFULLY

The concurrences in Iarussi are not throwaway commentary. They flag issues that can shape trial strategy, pretrial issue framing, and appellate posture.

A. JUDGE JAY: EVEN IF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WERE ALLOWED, IT MAY HAVE BEEN WAIVED BY AGREEMENT AND TRIAL FRAMING

Judge Jay concurred to make a practical point: even if a trial court had statutory authority to award prejudgment interest (which the majority rejected), the wife in this case would not have been entitled to it because the parties’ partial settlement agreement and pretrial filings did not preserve that claim.

The concurrence underscores two litigation realities:

– carefully drafted releases can bar later “add-on” liabilities that are not explicitly reserved; and
– pretrial statements and stipulations frame the issues and can operate as a waiver of matters not raised.

From a practitioner perspective, Judge Jay’s concurrence is a reminder that in complex dissolution cases, the law and the contract both matter—and issue preservation begins long before a proposed final judgment is filed.

B. JUDGE LONG: “RETROACTIVE ALIMONY” MAY NOT BE AUTHORIZED AT ALL IN AN INITIAL AWARD

Judge Long’s concurrence is the one most likely to generate future motion practice and appeals.

He argues that “retroactive alimony” at the initial final judgment is a judicially created concept lacking statutory authorization. His analysis is straightforward: section 61.08 authorizes only bridge-the-gap, rehabilitative, durational, and permanent alimony; section 61.071 governs temporary support during the case; and while section 61.14 permits retroactive modification of existing support orders, it does not authorize a retroactive initial award.

He also stresses separation-of-powers concerns: courts cannot create new categories of alimony absent legislative authorization.

Importantly, the majority notes that the husband did not squarely argue that retroactive alimony is unauthorized, so the panel did not decide the issue in the opinion itself. But because the case was remanded for recalculation of alimony, the concurrence signals that the issue is “in play” if properly raised.

If you handle contested alimony cases—especially cases with long pendency periods, interim distributions, or disputed temporary support—this concurrence should be on your radar.

WHY THIS CASE MATTERS FOR HIGH-ASSET FAMILY LAW LITIGATION

Iarussi is a case about statutory boundaries in money-heavy divorces:

– A cash equalization payment is not a damages award.
– Interest is authorized where the statute says it is authorized, not where “fairness” might suggest it.
– Alimony requires analysis of actual and reasonably available income, including investment returns.
– And the concurrences highlight that settlement agreements and pretrial framing can be dispositive—and that “retroactive alimony” may be vulnerable to a direct statutory challenge when properly preserved.

For lawyers litigating business valuation divorces, executive-level income cases, and disputes involving substantial liquid assets, the opinion provides both substantive ammunition and strategic lessons.